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Abstract—We propose the use of data transformations as a
defense against evasion attacks on ML classifiers. We present
and investigate strategies for incorporating a variety of data
transformations including dimensionality reduction via Principal
Component Analysis and data ‘anti-whitening’ to enhance the
resilience of machine learning, targeting both the classification
and the training phase. We empirically evaluate and demonstrate
the feasibility of linear transformations of data as a defense
mechanism against evasion attacks using multiple real-world
datasets. Our key findings are that the defense is (i) effective
against the best known evasion attacks from the literature,
resulting in a two-fold increase in the resources required by
a white-box adversary with knowledge of the defense for a
successful attack, (ii) applicable across a range of ML classifiers,
including Support Vector Machines and Deep Neural Networks,
and (iii) generalizable to multiple application domains, including
image classification and human activity classification.
I. INTRODUCTION
We are living in an era of ubiquitous machine learning
(ML) and artificial intelligence. Machine learning is being
used in a number of essential applications such as image
recognition [26], natural language processing [9], spam de-
tection [10], autonomous vehicles [8], [33] and even malware
detection [46], [11]. High classification accuracy in these
settings [23], [48], [2] has enabled the widespread deployment
of ML systems. Given the ubiquity of ML applications, it is
increasingly being deployed in adversarial scenarios, where
an attacker stands to gain from the failure of a ML system
to classify inputs correctly. The question then arises: are ML
systems secure in adversarial settings?
Adversarial Machine Learning: Starting in the early 2000s,
there has been a considerable body of work [20], [3], [25]
exposing the vulnerability of machine learning algorithms
to strategic adversaries. For example, poisoning attacks [5]
systematically introduce adversarial data during the training
phase with the aim of causing the misclassification of data
during the test phase. On the other hand, evasion attacks [4],
[35], [47] aim to fool existing ML classifiers trained on benign
data by adding strategic perturbations to test inputs.
Evasion attacks: In this paper we focus on evasion attacks
in which the adversary aims to perturb test inputs to ML
classifiers in order to cause misclassification. Evasion attacks
have been proposed for a variety of machine learning clas-
sifiers such as Support Vector Machines [4], [34], tree-based
classifiers [34], [22] such as random forests and boosted trees
and more recently for neural networks [16], [47], [35], [24],
[7], [32]. These attacks have been used to demonstrate the
vulnerability of applications that use machine learning, such
as facial recognition [29], [43], voice command recognition [6]
and PDF malware detection [53] in laboratory settings. Recent
work also illustrates the possibility of attacks on deployed
systems such as the Google video summarization API [19],
highlighting the urgent need for defenses. Surprisingly, it has
also been shown that the evasion properties of adversarially
modified data (for a particular classifier) persist across differ-
ent ML classifiers [47], which allows an adversary with limited
knowledge of the ML system to attack it.
However, very few defenses [39], [22] exist against these
attacks, and the applicability of each is limited to only cer-
tain known attacks and specific types of ML classifiers (see
Section VII for a detailed description of and comparison with
previous work).
A. Contributions
We propose and thoroughly investigate the use of linear
transformations of data as a defense against evasion attacks.
We consider powerful adversaries with knowledge of our
defenses when evaluating their effectiveness and find that they
demonstrably reduce the success of evasion attacks. To the
best of our knowledge, ours are the only defenses against
evasion attacks with the following properties: (1) applicabil-
ity across multiple ML classifiers (such as SVMs, DNNs),
(2) applicability in varied application domains (image and
activity classification), and (3) mitigation of multiple attack
types, including strategic ones. Further, the tunability of our
defense allows a system designer to pick appropriate operating
points on the utility-security tradeoff curve depending on the
application.
1) Defense: We propose the use of data transformations as
a defense mechanism. Specifically, we consider linear dimen-
sionality reduction techniques such as Principal Component
Analysis which aim to project high-dimensional data to a
lower-dimensional space while preserving the most useful
variance of the data [44], [51]. We present and investigate a
strategy for incorporating dimensionality reduction and other
linear transformations of data to enhance the resilience of
machine learning, targeting both the classification and training
phases. Data transformations are applied to the training data
to enhance the resilience of the trained classifier and they
significantly change the learned classifier. Linear data transfor-
mations are a generalization of regularization methods. They
allow us to access novel and otherwise inaccessible robustness-
performance tradeoffs.
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2) Empirical Evaluation: We empirically demonstrate the
feasibility and effectiveness of our defenses using:
• multiple ML classifiers, such as Support Vector Machines
(SVMs) and Deep Neural Networks (DNNs);
• several distinct types of evasion attacks, such as an attack
on Linear SVMs from Moosavi-Dezfooli et. al. [30], and
on deep neural networks from Goodfellow et. al. [16]
and Carlini et al. [7], which is the best known attack for
neural networks, as well as white-box attacks targeting
our defense;
• a variety of real-world datasets/applications: the MNIST
image dataset [27] and the UCI Human Activity Recog-
nition (HAR) dataset [1].
Our key findings are that even in the face of a white-box
adversary with complete knowledge of the ML system:
• Security: the defense leads to significant increases of
up to 5× in the degree of modification required for a
successful attack and equivalently, reduces adversarial
success rates by around 2 − 50× at fixed levels of
perturbation.
• Generality: the defense can be used for different ML
classifiers (and application domains) with minimal modi-
fication of the original classifiers, while still being effec-
tive at combating adversarial examples.
• Utility: there is a modest utility loss of about 0.5-2%
in the classification success on benign samples in most
cases.
We also provide an analysis of the utility-security tradeoffs as
well as the computational overheads incurred by our defense.
Our results may be reproduced using the open source code
available at https://github.com/anonymous1.
We note that our defense does not completely solve the
problem of evasion attacks, since it reduces adversarial success
rates at fixed budgets, but does not make them negligible in
all cases. However, since our defense is classifier and dataset-
agnostic it can be used in conjunction with other defenses
such as adversarial training in order to close this gap. We will
explore the synergy of our defense with other techniques in
future work. We hope that our work inspires further research
in combating the problem of evasion attacks and securing
machine learning based systems.
II. ADVERSARIAL MACHINE LEARNING
In this section, we present the required background on
adversarial machine learning, focusing on evasion attacks that
induce misclassification by perturbing the input at test time.
Motivation and Running Example: We use image data
from the MNIST dataset [27] for our running examples.
Figure 1(a) depicts example test images from the MNIST
dataset that are correctly classified by a SVM classifier (see
Section IV for details), while Figure 1(b) depicts adversarially
crafted test images (perturbed images using the evasion attack
of Moosavi-Dezfooli et. al. [30]), which are misclassified by
a linear SVM.
1Link anonymized for double-blind submission
(a) Typical test images from the MNIST dataset. Correctly classifed
as 7, 2, 1, 0 and 4 respectively.
(b) Corresponding adversarial images obtained using the evasion
attack on Linear SVMs [30]. Now, misclassified as 9, 9, 3, 2 and
0 respectively.
Fig. 1: Comparison of benign and adversarial images taken
from the MNIST dataset.
Classification using machine learning: We focus on su-
pervised machine learning, in which a classifier is trained
on labeled data. For our purposes, a classifier is a function
that takes as input a data point x ∈ Rd and produces
an output yˆ ∈ C, where C is the set of all categories.
The classifier succeeds if yˆ matches the true class y ∈ C.
For example, for the MNIST dataset, x is a 28 × 28 pixel
grayscale image of a handwritten digit and C is the finite set
{0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9}.
A. Attacks against machine learning systems
In this subsection we lay out the notation for the remain-
der of the paper, and describe the adversarial model under
consideration.
1) Adversarial goals: In each case, the adversary is given
an input x with true class y and uses an attack algorithm A
to produce a modified input x˜ = A(x).
Attacks are relevant in the case where this input is correctly
classified: f(x) = y. The attack takes one of two forms.
• Untargeted attack: x˜ is misclassified (f(x˜) 6= y)
• Targeted attack: x˜ is classified as a specific class t ∈ C
(f(x˜) = t, t 6= y)
Note that these attacks are equivalent for binary classifiers.
Additionally, the adversarial example x˜ should be as similar to
the benign example as possible. Similarity is quantified using
some metric on the space of examples. As in previous work,
we focus on example spaces that are vector spaces and use
p-norms as the metric [16], [7].
2) Adversarial knowledge: We consider three settings. The
first is the white box setting, in which the adversary knows the
classification function f , all its parameters and the existence
of a defense, if any. This assumption on the adversary’s
capabilities is conservative as this setting corresponds to a
very powerful adversary. A system with the ability to defend
against attacks from an adversary with complete knowledge
does not rely on security through obscurity.
In the second setting, we consider somewhat less powerful
adversaries which may be more prevalent. We call this is
the classifier mismatch setting. Here, the adversary knows
the training dataset X, the architecture of the the original
2
classifier and the hyperparameters (i.e regularization constants
etc.) used in the training of the original classifier without the
defense. Thus, the adversary is capable of training a classifier
fˆ that mimics that true classifier f . The adversary generates
examples that are adversarial on fˆ and submits them to f . Note
that since the adversary is not aware of the defense measures
taken, there is a mismatch between fˆ and f , hence the term
‘classifier mismatch’ for this setting.
Further, it has been shown in previous work [34], [47] that
adversarial examples transfer across classifiers with different
architectures and hyperparameter settings, so adversaries can
use their own models trained on similar datasets to construct
adversarial samples for the ML system under attack. Thus, we
consider a third setting, the architecture mismatch setting2,
where the adversary is unaware of the classifier architecture
being used, and just trains some fˆ on the portion of the training
data available. This is a plausible practical setting, since
knowledge about the architecture and the hyperparameters of
the network under attack may be difficult for the adversary to
obtain.
B. Evasion attacks on specific classifiers
We now describe existing attacks from the literature for
specific ML classifiers such as linear classifiers and neural
networks. These are summarized in Table I
1) Optimal attacks on linear classifiers: In the multi-class
classification setting for Linear SVMs, a classifier gi is trained
for each class i ∈ C, where
gi : x 7→ wTi x+ bi. (1)
The final classifier f assigns x to the class f(x) =
argmaxi∈C gi(x). Given that the true class is y ∈ C, the
objective of an untargeted attack is to find the closest point x˜
such that f(x˜) 6= y.
From [30], we know the optimal attacks on affine multi-
class classifiers under the `2 metric. This attack finds x˜ that
minimizes ‖x˜ − x‖2 subject to the constraint f(x˜) 6= t. For
x such that f(x) = y and targeted class t ∈ C, let zt,y =
wt − wy . Observe that gt(x) − gy(x) = zTt,yx. Then, the
adversarial example
x˜t = x−
(zTt,yx)zt,y
‖zt,y‖22
(2)
satisfies zTt,yx˜t = 0. The minimum modification required to
cause a misclassification as t is
t = ‖x− x˜t‖2 =
‖zt,yzTt,yx‖2
‖zt,y‖22
=
zTt,yx
‖zt,y‖2 . (3)
Thus the optimal choice of x˜ for an untargeted attack is x˜k,
where k = argmint t.
2This is commonly referred to in the literature as a black-box setting, but
we use a different terminology to highlight the exact nature of the adversary’s
lack of knowledge.
2) Gradient based attacks on neural networks: The Fast
Gradient Sign (FGS) attack is an efficient attack against neural
networks introduced in [16]. This attack is for the `∞ metric.
Adversarial examples are generated by adding adversarial
noise proportional to the sign of the gradient of the loss
function J(x, y, θ). Here, x is the example, y is the true class,
and θ is the network weight parameters. Concretely,
x˜(η)i = xi + η sgn(∇xJ(x, y, θ))i. (4)
The gradient can be efficiently calculated using backpropaga-
tion. The parameter η controls the magnitude of the adversarial
perturbation, similar to  for the attack on Linear SVMs:
‖x− x˜(η)‖∞ = max
i
|η sgn(∇xJ(x, y, θ))i| = η. (5)
See Figure 13 in the Appendix for images modified with a
range of η.
The FGS attack and the attack on Linear SVMs are con-
strained according to different norms. To facilitate a compari-
son of the robustness of classifiers as well as the effectiveness
of our defense across them, we propose a modification of the
FGS attack which is constrained by the `2 norm. Denoting
this as the Fast Gradient (FG) attack, we define the adversarial
examples to be equal to
x˜() = x+ 
∇xJ(x, y, θ)
‖∇xJ(x, y, θ)‖2 . (6)
For the FG attack,  is the `2 norm of the perturbation.
3) Optimization-based attacks on neural networks: The
direct optimization based formulation of adversarial sample
generation for a classifier f is
min d(x˜,x), (7)
s.t. f(x˜) 6= f(x)
x˜ ∈ C,
where d is an appropriately chosen distance metric and C
is the constraint on the input space. Since the constraint
f(x˜) 6= f(x) in the above optimization problem is combi-
natorial, various related forms of this minimization problem
have been proposed [47], [7], [30]. We focus on the relaxation
studied by Carlini and Wagner [7]:
min d(x˜,x) + λ`(x˜, f), (8)
s.t. x˜ ∈ C.
Carlini and Wagner investigate a variety of loss functions `(·)
as well as methods to ensure the generated adversarial sample
stays within the input space constraints. In our experiments
with neural networks, for untargeted attacks we the use a loss
function, max(Z(x˜)o −max{Z(x˜) : i 6= o},−κ), where o is
the original class of the input, Z(·) represents the output of
the neural network before the softmax layer and κ represents
the confidence parameter. The distance metric used is the `2
norm since it is found to perform the best.
We evaluate the effectiveness of our defense against this
state-of-the-art attack in Section V.
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TABLE I: Summary of attacks on Linear SVMs and neural networks.
Attack Classifier Constraint Intuition
Optimal attack on Linear SVMs [30] Linear SVMs `2 Move towards classifier boundary
Fast Gradient Neural networks `2 First order approximation to direction of smallest perturbation
Fast Gradient Sign [16] Neural networks `∞ Constant scaling for each pixel models perception better
Carlini’s `2 attack [7] Neural networks `2 Iterative optimization over relaxed minimization problem
III. DATA TRANSFORMATIONS AS A DEFENSE
In the previous section, we have seen that ML classifiers are
vulnerable to a variety of different evasion attacks. Thus, there
is a clear need for a defense mechanism that is effective against
a variety of attacks, since a priori, the owner of the system has
no knowledge of the range of possible attacks. Further, finding
a defense that works across multiple classifiers can direct us
to a better understanding of why ML systems are vulnerable
in the first place.
In this section, we present a defense that is resilient to
attacks from the literature in the mismatch setting, and remains
effective even in the presence of a white-box adversary with
knowledge of the defense. Further, the defense makes multiple
types of ML classifiers operating in different application sce-
narios more robust as shown by our results in Section V. The
defense is based on linear transformations of data, including
linear dimensionality reduction.
A. Overview of defense
The dimension of the data is d and the training data is a
d×n matrix X, so each example is a column. We assume the
data is centered, i.e. X1 = 0 where 1 ∈ Rn is the vector of
all ones and 0 ∈ Rd is the vector of all zeros. The set of data
classes is C and the classifier in use is f : Rd → C.
In our defense, we leverage linear transformations of the
data to make the classifier more resilient by modifying the
training phase. In the first step of our defense, an algorithm se-
lects a linear transformation such as dimensionality reduction
based on properties of the data distribution. Then, the training
data X is transformed and a new classifier f is then trained
on the transformed training set. In the classification phase, all
inputs are transformed in the same way before being provided
to the classifier.
Algorithm 1 LTtrain
Input: X, Train, Select
Output: f
1: Select the linear transformation B = Select(X)
2: Compute the transformed training set BX
3: Train classifier f aux = Train(BX)
4: Let f = (x 7→ f aux(Bx))
The additional inputs to Algorithm 1 are:
• Select: The algorithm used to select a linear transfor-
mation of the data based on some properties of the
data. This may be a specialization of a more gen-
eral algorithm to specific parameters: e.g. Select =
TopPrincipalComponents(k).
• Train: This is the algorithm used to train classifiers of the
desired class. In general, this will be a specialization of
more general training algorithm to specific parameters.
For example, Train might produce a neural network
via Stochastic Gradient Descent [15] starting from the
untrained classifier network f0 using training parameters
θ.
At first glance, this approach may seem futile, because the
initial layer of many machine learning classifiers, including
SVMs and neural networks, is a linear function. However,
although these classifiers are already capable of applying any
linear transformation to the data that the training procedure
finds to be useful, the standard training process does not
optimize for adversarial robustness and does not choose to
make these transformation, even though they are available.
Thus, an explicit linear transformation of the data is capable
of significantly changing the learned classifier and a carefully
selected transformation can lead to beneficial changes.
B. Effect on Support Vector Machines
To motivate Algorithm 1, we examine in detail the case
where Train produces a linear classifier by learning a support
vector machine.
Learning a SVM [41] that can classify data points from
two classes, yi ∈ {−1, 1}, involves finding an affine function
f(x) = wTx+ b that minimizes the following loss function
L(X;w, b) =
1
2
wTw +
∑
i
max(−1, yi(wTxi + b)). (9)
If we use Algorithm 1 and apply an invertible linear trans-
formation B to the training data, we will learn an alternative
function gaux(x) = uTx+ b′ that minimizes
L(AX;u, b′) =
1
2
uTu+
∑
i
max(−1, yi(uTBxi + b)). (10)
Our actual classifier will be g(x) = gaux(Bx) = uTBx + b′.
Let w = BTu and rewrite (10) as
1
2
uTBB−1(B−1)TBTu+
∑
i
max(−1, yi(uTBxi + b))
=
1
2
wT(BBT)−1w +
∑
i
max(−1, yi(wTxi + b)). (11)
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Selecting the u that minimizes (10) and composing it with BT
is equivalent to directly selecting the value of w that minimizes
(11). Thus applying an invertible linear transformation to the
data is equivalent to modifying the quadratic form that appears
in the regularization term of the SVM loss function.
Regularization: A standard generalization of (9) multiplies
the 12w
Tw by a regularization parameter λ. This corresponds
to the simplest possible linear transformation of the data:
multiplication by a constant. Explicitly, we have B = 1√
λ
I.
Thus, ordinary regularization of SVMs fits neatly into this
framework. However, more general linear transformations
provide us with significantly more flexibility to modify the
regularization constraint and allow us to access novel and
otherwise inaccessible robustness-performance tradeoffs.
Singular linear transformations: What happens if B is
not invertible? In this case, BTu is a member of imBT by
definition.3 Then w = BTu minimizes
1
2
wT(BBT)+w +
∑
i
max(−1, yi(wTxi + b))
over w ∈ imBT, where (BBT)+ is the Moore-Penrose
pseudoinverse of B. 4 [38]. In addition to modifying the
costs assigned to each weight vector, applying a non-invertible
transformation B to the data rules out some choices of w
completely. Alternatively, one can think of the regularization
term as assigning an infinite cost to each w ∈ kerB and thus
to each w 6∈ imBT.5
Expressivity: For a fixed collection of data points, it is
possible to find a linear transformation that results in the
selection of essentially any hard-decision classifier positively
correlated with the true labels. Observe that this is the op-
posite of the naive fear described in Section III-A that linear
transformations should have no effect on the learned classifier:
the choice of linear transformation might influence the final
classifier structure too much! Because of this, it is essential to
select linear transformations in a systematic matter.
C. Defense using PCA
Several of the choices of Select that we will use in
Algorithm 1 are based on Principal Component Analysis.
1) PCA in brief: PCA [44] is a linear transformation of
the data that identifies so-called ‘principal axes’ in the space
of the data, which are the directions in which the data has
maximum variance, and projects the original data along these
axes. The dimensionality of the data is reduced by choosing
to project it along k principal axes. The choice of k depends
on what percentage of the original variance is to be retained.
Intuitively, PCA identifies the directions in which the ‘signal’,
or useful information in the data is present, and discards the
rest as noise.
3The image of the operator BT is the vector space of linear combinations
of columns of the matrix BT.
4Because BBT is a symmetric matrix, it has a spectral decomposition
BBT = VΛVT where Λ is diagonal. Then (BBT)+ = VΛ+VT where
Λ+ is diagonal, (Λ+)ii = Λ−1ii if Λii 6= 0, and (Λ+)ii = 0 otherwise.
5The kernel of the operator B is the space of vectors x such that Bx = 0.
kerB is orthogonal to imBT.
Fig. 2: Magnitudes of the coefficients of the weight vector
w of a linear SVM in the principal component basis. On the
horizontal axis, we have
√
λi. On the vertical axis, |(UTw)i|.
The classifier is trained on the original MNIST data.
Concretely, let the data samples be column vectors xi ∈ Rd
for i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, let X be the d×n matrix of centered data
samples. The principal components of X are the normalized
eigenvectors of its sample covariance matrix C = XXT.
More precisely, because C is positive semidefinite, there is a
decomposition C = UΛUT where U is an orthogonal matrix,
Λ = diag(λ1, . . . , λd), and λ1 ≥ . . . ≥ λd ≥ 0. In particular,
U is the d × d matrix whose columns are unit eigenvectors
of C. The eigenvalue λi is the variance of X along the ith
component.
Each column of UTX is a data sample represented in the
principal component basis. Let Xk be the projection of the
sample data in the k-dimensional subspace spanned by the k
largest principal components. Thus Xk = UIkITkU
TX, where
Ik is a d × k rectangular diagonal matrix. The amount of
variance retained is
∑k
i=1 λi, which is the sum of the k largest
eigenvalues.
2) Implementing the defense: There are two choices of a
linear transformation that keep the k largest principal compo-
nents: B = ITkU
T, which is a k× d matrix, and B = UTIkU,
which is a d× d matrix. For some choices of Train including
SVMs trained using (9), these choices of A are equivalent,
i.e. they will output identical classifiers given the same inputs.
The choice B = ITkU
T allows for more efficient training
because representation of the data is more compact. The choice
B = UIkI
T
kU
T makes is it easier to compare the reduced
dimension data to the original data.
The complexity analysis for the PCA-based defense is in
Section IX-A (c.f. Appendix).
D. Intuition behind the PCA defense
We will give some intuition about why dimensionality
reduction should improve resilience for SVMs. We discuss
the two-class case for simplicity, but the ideas generalize to
the multiple class case. The core of a linear classifier is a
function g(x) = wTx + b. Both x and w can be expressed
in the principal component basis as UTx and UTw. We
expect that many of the principal components with the largest
coefficients in the weight vector, |(UTw)i|, to correspond to
small eigenvalues λi.
The reason for this is very simple: in order for different
principal components to achieve the same level of influence on
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the classifier output, |(UTw)i| must be proportional to 1/
√
λi.
To take advantage of the information in a component with
small variation, the classifier must use a large coefficient. Of
course, the principal components vary in their usefulness for
classification. However, among the components that are useful,
we expect a general trend of decreasing coefficients of (UTw)i
as
√
λi increases.
Figure 2 validates this prediction. Many of the principal
components with very low variances have large coefficients
in w. As variance increases, the coefficients tend to decrease.
The exception to the trend is the first principal component, but
this is not surprising. The first principal component6 is by far
the most useful source of classification information because
it is strongly aligned with the difference of the class means.
Consequently it does not fit the overall trend and actually has
the largest coefficient. However, among the other components,
there is a mixture of cross-class and in-class variation and the
trend holds.
Effect on robustness: Since the optimal attack perturbation
for a linear classifier is a multiple of w, the principal com-
ponents with large coefficients are the ones that the attacker
takes advantage of. The defense denies this opportunity to
the attacker by forcing the classifier to assign no weight to
the low variance components. This significantly changes the
resulting w that the classifier learns. The classifier loses access
to some information, but accessing that information required
large weight coefficients, so the attacker is hurt far more.
Thus, by using only high variance components, the classifier
gains significant adversarial robustness for the loss of a small
amount of classification performance.
Figure 3 shows the coefficient magnitudes for classifiers
trained on data projected onto the top k principal components.
Observe that eliminating the low variance principal compo-
nents mostly removes the relationship between the variance
of a component and the corresponding coefficient of UTw.
E. Other linear transformations and classifiers
1) Anti-whitening: Now we will discuss another linear
transformation based on the principal components of the
training data that can confer additional robustness. As before,
we have C = XXT = UΛUT. The linear transformation
which we call ‘anti-whitening’ is accomplished by selecting
B = Λ
c
2U and B = UΛ
c
2U for some c > 0. In our
experiments, we use the former but the latter is conceptually
easier to work with. Anti-whitening exaggerates the disparity
between the variances of the components. In the full rank
case, the quadratic form introduced in the SVM loss is C−c.
It serves as a softer alternative to completely eliminating low
variance principal components: the hard cutoff IkITk is replaced
with the gradual penalty Λ
c
2 . Low variance components are
still available for use, but the price of accessing them is
increased.
2) Neural networks: Neural networks are more complicated
due to the non-uniqueness of local minima in the associated
6on the top right in each plot
(a) k = 331
(b) k = 100
Fig. 3: The magnitudes of the coefficients of the weight
vector w of a linear SVM in the principal component
basis. On the horizontal axis, we have
√
λi. On the vertical
axis, |(UTw)i|. The classifiers are trained on the MNIST data
projected onto the top k principal components.
loss function and the larger variety of regularization methods
that are employed. At first glance, it may seem that adding a
linear layer as the first layer of a neural network may provide
the same benefits as PCA-based dimensionality reduction.
However, the training process does not optimize for robust-
ness, so in practice the linear layer that is learned does not have
the desired effect7, unlike in our defense where the linear layer
weights are separately specified using PCA. Thus, the intution
for the effectiveness of linear transformations carries over from
the case of Linear SVMs, with the adversary losing access to
dimensions which aid in the creation of adversarial samples,
while the classifier remains largely unaffected since most of
the information required for classification is retained. Further,
in our empirical results in Section V, it is clear that the average
distance to the boundary of the classifier increases when the
linear transformation is added, thus leading to robustness.
Finally, we note that for Linear SVMs, standard regular-
ization can also be understood as increasing the price of all
components, which reduces the dependence of the classifier on
components that only provide marginal classification benefit.
However, in the case of neural networks, the usual regulariza-
tion of the weight matrix does not follow the intuition given
here for increasing robustness.
F. Attacks against the linear transformation defense
In order to evaluate our proposed defense mechanism,
we carry out the attacks described in Section II-B against
classifiers learned using our defense. Both for linear classifiers
7In fact, Gu and Rigazio [17] found that even non-linear denoising layers
do not add adversarial robustness.
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and neural networks, the classifier learned using our defense
lies in the same family as the classifier that would be learned
without the defense. Thus, simple modifications of existing
attacks give the white-box versions of attacks against the
classifier with the defense.
1) White-box attacks: Due to the inclusion of a linear
transformation of the data, the overall classifier is f(x) =
f aux(Bx). In the white-box setting, since the adversary is
aware of the exact parameters of the classifier produced by
the defense, attacks are carried out with respect to the overall
classifier. For the optimal attack on Linear SVMs, a similar
change is made, where each wi (the output of the SVM
optimization) is replaced by BTwi, since that is the term which
acts on the input x. Thus, the adversarial sample now is
x˜t = x−
(zTt,yBx)B
Tzt,y
‖BTzt,y‖22
. (12)
In the case of gradient based attacks on neural networks,
the gradient of the loss is
∇xJ(x, y, θ) = ∇xJ aux(Bx, y, θ) = BT∇xJ aux(x, y, θ),
(13)
where J is the loss function associated with f and J aux
is associated with f aux. The loss of the neural network is
computed with respect to its input, which is now Bx, but
the adversary has to add a perturbation to the input x, which
causes the largest increase in loss (up to first order). The FG
attack on the defended network is then
x˜() = x+ 
BT∇xJ aux(x, y, θ)
‖BT∇xJ aux(x, y, θ)‖2 . (14)
In the case of the optimization based attack on neural net-
works, the optimization objective remains the same, with a
change in the classifier the loss function is computed over:
min d(x˜,x) + λ`(x˜, f), (15)
s.t. x˜ ∈ C,
where f(x) = f aux(Bx). In our experiments, we first compute
the linear transformation matrix, and then add it as a linear
layer after the input layer of the neural network.
2) Classifier mismatch attacks: In this setting, the adversary
trains a classifier fˆ that mimics the original classifier f , but is
not aware of the defense. We assume the adversary is able to
train fˆ such that it perfectly matches f trained on the original
data without any linear transformations. The adversarial sam-
ples are thus generated with respect to fˆ = Train(X), and not
with respect to the true classifier f = (x 7→ (Train(BX)(x)).
Equivalently, this setting corresponds to the adversary using
Algorithm 1 with the true training examples X, the true
training function Train, but with a different choice of Select.
The adversary does not know the true Select function, so they
use a trivial version that always returns I.
3) Architecture mismatch attacks: In this setting, the adver-
sary trains a classifier fˆ using a choice of Train that does not
match that used to produce f . Thus fˆ is not only a different
function from f , but it may come from a different family of
classifiers. For example, f may be a three layer neural network
and fˆ may be a five layer neural network. As in the classifier
mismatch setting, the adversary is not aware of the defense
used (the choice of Select).
The classifier and architecture mismatch attack settings are
interesting to consider since the problem of the transferability
of adversarial samples [34] is still an open research ques-
tion. Our results in these settings demonstrate that a defense
using linear transformations can mitigate the threat posed by
transferability.
4) Goal of the defenses: The goal of our defense is to
increase classifier robustness. Specifically, the defenses in-
crease the distance between benign examples and nearest
adversarial examples. Unlike some proposed defenses, we
are not attempting to make the process of finding adversarial
examples computationally difficult. While it is possible to use
known attacks against classifiers produced by our defense, the
resulting adversarial examples will be farther away from the
benign examples that the adversarial examples for undefended
classifiers. Thus, the fact that these attacks find adversarial
examples is not a limitation of our approach.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
In this section we provide brief descriptions and imple-
mentation details of the datasets, machine learning algorithms,
dimensionality reduction algorithms, and metrics used in our
experiments.
A. Datasets
In our evaluation, we use two datasets. The first is the
MNIST image dataset and the second is the UCI Human
Activity Recognition dataset. We now describe each of these
in detail.
1) MNIST: This is a dataset of images of handwritten
digits [27]. There are 60,000 training examples and 10,000
test examples. Each image belongs to a single class from 0 to
9. The images have a dimension of 28×28 pixels (total of 784)
and are grayscale. The digits are size-normalized and centred.
This dataset is used commonly as a ‘sanity-check’ or first-
level benchmark for state-of-the-art classifiers. We use this
dataset since it has been extensively studied from the attack
perspective by previous work. It is also easy to visualize the
effects of our defenses on this dataset.
2) UCI Human Activity Recognition (HAR) using Smart-
phones: This is a dataset of measurements obtained from
a smartphone’s accelerometer and gyroscope [1] while the
participants holding it performed one of six activities. Of the
30 participants, 21 were chosen to provide the training data,
and the remaining 9 the test data. There are 7352 training
samples and 2947 test samples. Each sample has 561 features,
which are various signals obtained from the accelerometer and
gyroscope. The six classes of activities are Walking, Walking
Upstairs, Walking Downstairs, Sitting, Standing and Laying.
We used this dataset to demonstrate that our defenses work
across multiple datasets and applications.
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B. Machine learning algorithms
We have evaluated our defenses across multiple machine
learning algorithms including linear Support Vector Machines
(SVMs) and a variety of neural networks with different
configurations. All experiments were run on a desktop run-
ning Ubuntu 14.04, with an 4-core Intel R© CoreTM i7-6700K
CPU running at 4.00GHz, 24 GB of RAM and a NVIDIA R©
GeForce R© GTX 960 GPU.
1) Linear SVMs: : Ease of training and the interpretability
of separating hyperplane weights has led to the use of Linear
SVMs in a wide range of applications [40], [2]. We use the
LinearSVC implementation from the Python package scikit-
learn [37] for our experiments, which uses the ‘one-versus-
rest’ method for multi-class classification by default.
In our experiments, we obtained a classification accuracy of
91.5% for the MNIST dataset and 96.7% for the HAR dataset.
2) Neural networks: Neural networks can be configured
by changing the number of layers, the activation functions
of the neurons, the number of neurons in each layer etc. We
performed most of our experiments on a standard neural net-
work used in previous work, for the purposes of comparison.
The network we use is a standard one from [47] which we
refer to as FC100-100-10 and a variant of it, FC200-200-
200-10. The first neural network has an input layer, followed
by 2 hidden layers, each containing 100 neurons, and an
output softmax layer containing 10 neurons. Similarly, the
second neural network has 3 hidden layers, each containing
200 neurons. Each neuron has a sigmoid activation function
and the loss function used for training is the cross-entropy loss.
We also ran experiments with a neural network with Rectified
Linear Units (ReLU) as the neurons. We omit those results
here due to lack of space and since they are very similar to
the sigmoid activation results for the datasets we use. Both
FC100-100-10 and FC200-200-200-10 are trained with a
learning rate of 0.01 and momentum of 0.9 for 500 epochs.
The size of each minibatch is 500. On the MNIST test data,
we get a classification accuracy of 97.71% for FC100-100-
10 and 98.02% for FC200-200-200-10. We use Theano [49],
a Python library optimized for mathematical operations with
multi-dimensional arrays and Lasagne [13], a deep learning
library that uses Theano, for neural network experiments.
Our classification accuracy results for both Linear SVMs
and fully connected neural networks are comparable to base-
line numbers8 for corresponding architectures on MNIST,
validating our implementation.
C. Linear transformation techniques
We use the PCA module from scikit-learn [37]. Depending
on the application, either the number of components to be
projected onto, or the percentage of variance to be retained
can be specified. After performing PCA on the vectorized
MNIST training data to retain 99% of the variance, the reduced
dimension is 331, which is the first reduced dimension we use
in our experiments on PCA based defenses. For anti-whitening,
8http://yann.lecun.com/exdb/mnist/
we use a slight modification of the PCA interface to create the
required transformation matrix.
D. Metrics
We evaluate the relationship between  = ‖x − x˜‖, which
is the allowed distance between the original example and the
adversarial example, and the adversarial success rate, which
we compute as follows. For each benign input x with true
label y, we check two conditions: if after perturbation, f(x˜) 6=
f(x) and if initially, f(x) = y. Thus, the adversary’s attempt
is successful if the original classification was correct but the
new classification on the adversarial sample is incorrect. In a
sense, this count represents the number of samples that are
truly adversarial, since it is only the adversarial perturbation
that is causing misclassification, and not an inherent difficulty
for the classifier in classifying this sample. While reporting
adversarial success rates, we divide this count by the total
number of benign samples correctly classified after they pass
through the entire robust classification pipeline.
V. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In this section we present an overview of our empirical
results. The main questions we seek to answer with our
evaluations are:
(i) Is the defense effective in the classifier mismatch setting?
(ii) Is the defense effective in the white box setting?
(iii) Does the defense work for different classifier families?
(iv) Does the defense generalize across different datasets?
(v) Which linear transformations are most effective?
Our evaluation results confirm the effectiveness of our
defense in a variety of scenarios, each of which has a different
combination of datasets, machine learning algorithms, attacks
and linear transformation used for the defense. For each set
of evaluations, we vary a particular step of the classification
pipeline and fix the others. Our results are summarized in
Table II.
Baseline configuration: We start by considering a classifi-
cation pipeline with the MNIST dataset as input data, a Linear
SVM as our classification algorithm and PCA as the linear
transformation used in our defense. Since we consider the
Linear SVM as our classifier, we evaluate its susceptibility
to adversarial samples generated using the attack on Linear
SVMs described in Section II-A. We evaluate our defenses on
adversarial samples created starting from the test set for each
dataset. Unless otherwise noted, all security and utility results
are for the complete test set. To empirically demonstrate that
our defense is resilient not only in this baseline case, but also
various configurations of it, we systematically investigate its
effect as each component of the pipeline, as well as the attacks,
are changed.
Note that in all of the plots showing the effectiveness of our
defense, the legend key ‘None’ denotes adversarial success for
a classifier without any defense.
A. Effect of defense on Support Vector Machines
In the baseline case, we begin by answering questions (i)
and (ii) for Linear SVMs.
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Data set Classifier Attack type Defense type and parameter Robustness improvement Accuracy reduction
MNIST Linear SVM Classifier mismatch PCA (80) 25× 0.22%
MNIST Linear SVM White-box (optimal) PCA (80) 6× 0.22%
MNIST FC100-100-10 White-box (FG) PCA (40) 1.5× 0.76%
MNIST FC100-100-10 White-box (FGS) PCA (40) 2.2× 0.76%
MNIST FC100-100-10 White-box (Opt.) PCA (40) 1.7× 0.76%
MNIST FC200-200-200-10 Arch. mismatch (FC100-100-10) PCA (40) 2.4× 0.85%
MNIST FC100-100-10 White-box (FG) Anti-whiten (2) 1.7× 0.15%
HAR Linear SVM White-box (optimal) PCA (70) 1.5× 2.3%
TABLE II: Robustness improvement at a misclassification rate of 60%. The table also gives the accuracy reduction for
different classifiers, attacks and defenses on the MNIST and HAR datasets.
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Fig. 4: Effectiveness of the defense in classifier mismatch
setting for the MNIST dataset with Linear SVMs. The
adversarial example success on the MNIST dataset is plotted
versus the perturbation magnitude  = ‖x− x˜‖2. The attack is
performed against the original classifier and the effect of the
defense is plotted for each reduced dimension k.
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Fig. 5: Effectiveness of the defense for the MNIST dataset
against optimal white-box attacks on Linear SVMs.
1) Defense in the classifier mismatch setting: Figure 4
shows the variation in adversarial success against SVMs in the
classifier mismatch setting. The defense significantly reduces
adversarial success rates. For example, at  = 1.0, the defense
using PCA with a reduced dimension of k = 80 reduces
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Fig. 6: Tradeoff between SVM classification performance
on benign test data, and adversarial performance. The x-
axis represents the average over test samples of the minimum
perturbation needed to cause misclassification. The legend
1e+00 denotes the regularization constant used to train the
SVM.
adversarial success from 100% to 3.4% 9. This is a 96.6%
or around 29.4× decrease in the adversarial success rate. At
 = 0.5, where the adversarial success rate is 99% , the defense
with k = 80 brings the adversarial success rate down to just
2%, which is a 49.5× decrease. Clearly, training with reduced
dimension data leads to more robust Linear SVMs, and this
can be seen in the effectiveness of the defense.
Further, as we decrease the reduced dimension k used in the
projection step of the defense, adversarial success decreases,
allowing the system designer to tune the defense according to
her needs. At k = 331, the adversarial success rate is 56.7%
at  = 1.0, which drops to 5.9% when k = 100. At k = 30,
at the same , the adversarial success rate drops to 4.4% with
a further decrease to 1.42% using aggressive dimensionality
reduction with k = 10.
In the classifier mismatch setting, the defense also acts like
a noise removal process, removing adversarial perturbations
and leaving behind the clean input data. This accounts for the
added robustness we see in this setting as compared to the
9We note here that all changes in adversarial success (and utility) are
expressed in terms of the change in percentage points, i.e. a fall of x%
indicates the absolute difference in the percentages, and not a relative
difference.
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white box setting. Further, this mitigates the problem of the
transferability of adversarial examples when the attacker is
only aware of the classifier used and not of the defense.
2) Defense in the white box setting: Figure 5 shows the
variation in adversarial success for the defense against the
optimal attack on Linear SVMs. This plot corresponds to
the case where the adversary is aware of the dimensionality
reduction defense and inputs a sample to the pipeline which is
designed to optimally evade the reduced dimension classifier.
At a perturbation magnitude of 0.5, where the classifier with
no defenses has a misclassification rate of 99.04%, the reduced
dimension classifier with k = 80 has a misclassification rate of
just 19.75%, which represents a 80.25% or 5.01× decrease in
the adversarial success rates. At an adversarial budget of 1.3,
the misclassification rate for the classifier with no defenses is
100%, while it is about 66.7% for the classifier with a reduced
dimension of 40.
We can also study the effect of our defense on the adversar-
ial budget required to achieve a certain adversarial success
rate. A budget of 0.3 is required to achieve a 86.6% mis-
classification without the defense, while the required budget
for a classifier with a defense with k = 40 is 1.75, which
is a 5.83× increase. The corresponding numbers to achieve
a 98% misclassification rate are 0.5 without the defense and
2.5 with, which represents a 5× increase. The presence of the
defense forces the adversary to add much larger perturbations
to achieve the same misclassification rates. Thus, our defense
clearly reduces the effectiveness of an attack carried out by
a very powerful adversary with full knowledge of the defense
and the classifier as well as the ability to carry out optimal
attacks.
3) Utility-security tradeoff for defense: Figure 6 shows the
tradeoff between performance under ordinary and adversarial
conditions. The the kink in the tradeoff for this dataset is
clearly between 80 and 60. There is very little benefit in
classification performance by using more dimensions, and
essentially no benefit in robustness by using fewer. At k = 80,
we see a drop in classification success on the test set from
91.5% without any defenses, to 90.64% with the defense.
Thus, there is a modest utility loss of about 1.2% at this
value of k, as compared to a security gain of 5.9×, since
the perturbation needed to cause 50 % of the test set to be
misclassified increases from 0.16 to 0.95.
With these results, we can conclude that our defense is
effective for Linear SVMs in both the classifier-mismatch and
white-box settings. Now, we investigate the performance of
our defenses on neural networks, to substantiate our claim
of the applicability of our defenses across machine learning
classifiers.
B. Effect of defense on neural networks
We now modify the baseline configuration by changing the
classifier used to FC100-100-10. We evaluate our defenses
on both gradient-based attacks for FC100-100-10: the Fast
Gradient (FG) and Fast Gradient Sign (FGS) attacks as well
as on the state-of-the-art optimization based attack from
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Fig. 7: Effectiveness of the defense for the MNIST dataset
against FG attacks in the white box setting on FC100-
100-10.
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Fig. 8: Effectiveness of the defense for the MNIST dataset
against FGS attacks in the white box setting on FC100-
100-10.
Carlini et al. [7]. We continue to use the MNIST dataset and
PCA as the linear transformation. With these experiments, we
answer question iii), i.e. ‘Do the defenses work for different
classifiers?’ and further strengthen our claim that our defense
is effective in the white box setting.
1) Defense against Fast Gradient attack in the white box
setting: Figure 7 shows the variation in adversarial success
for the defense as  = ‖x− x˜‖2, the parameter governing the
strength of the FG attack, increases. The defense also reduces
adversarial success rates for this attack. At  = 1.0, the defense
using PCA with a reduced dimension of k = 40 reduces
adversarial success from 41.42% to 16.7%. This is a 24.72% or
around 2.5× decrease in the adversarial success rate. Again, at
 = 1.5, while the adversarial success rate is 72.42% without
any defense, the defense with k = 40 brings the adversarial
success rate down to 39.19%, which is a 33.23% or 1.8×
decrease. Thus, even for neural networks, the defense causes
significant reductions in adversarial success.
Again, we can study the effect of our defense on the ad-
versarial budget required to achieve a certain misclassification
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Fig. 9: Effectiveness of the defense for the MNIST dataset
against Carlini’s `2 untargeted attack in the white-box
setting on FC100-100-10.
percentage. A budget of roughly  = 1.3 is required to achieve
a 60% misclassification without the defense, while the required
budget for a classifier with the defense using k = 40 is 2,
which is a 1.53× increase.
Directly comparing neural networks and linear SVMs, it
appears that neural network are more robust to `2 constrained
attacks. However, it should be noted that while the Linear
SVM robustness was evaluated on optimal attacks, the non-
convex nature of the classification function in neural networks
implies that the FG attack is only a first order approximation
to an optimal attack.
2) Defense against Fast Gradient Sign attack in the white
box setting: The FGS attack is constrained in terms of the
`∞ norm, so all features with non-zero gradient are perturbed
by either η or −η. The MNIST dataset has pixel values
normalized to lie in [0, 1]. Thus if η = 0.5, the image with
every pixel equal to 0.5 can be generated from any initial
image. We restrict η to be less than 0.25.
In Figure 8, at η = 0.05, the adversarial success rate
falls from 41.64% to 10.14% for the defense with k = 40
which is a 31.5% or 4.1× reduction. Also, at η = 0.11, the
adversarial success rate is 91.59% without the defense and
48.92% for the defense with k = 40, which is a 42.67%
or 1.87× reduction. Further, the perturbation needed to cause
90% misclassification is 0.11 without the defense but increases
to 0.23 for the defense with k = 40, which is a 2.1× increase.
3) Defense against optimization based attack in the white-
box setting: We use Carlini and Wagner’s [7] `2 constrained
attack to find untargeted adversarial samples, i.e. the closest
possible x˜ in terms of the `2 norm. Since this attack returns the
minimal possible perturbation for each sample, in Figure 9 we
plot the CDF of the minimal perturbations found by the attack
over the test set in order to compare using the same metric
as the other results. To see that this attack is indeed more
powerful than the Fast Gradient attack (which uses the same
distance metric), note that at ‖x − x˜‖ = 1.0, the adversarial
success is around 65% compared to 41.42% for the FG attack,
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Fig. 10: Effectiveness of the defense for the MNIST dataset
for FG samples generated for FC100-100-10 on FC200-
200-200-10 (architecture mismatch setting) .
and at ‖x − x˜‖ = 1.5 it is 90% compared to 72.42% for the
FG attack.
We repeated the attack on neural networks enhanced using
our PCA-based defense. The attack was carried out on the
composite classifier, thus representing the white box setting.
In this case, we see that at ‖x − x˜‖ = 1.0 the adversarial
success falls to 29.5% using the defense with k = 40, which
represents a drop of 35.5% or 2.2×. At a larger allowed budget
of 1.5, the fall is 26.4% or 1.4× to 63.8%. Further, the budget
required to achieve a misclassification rate of 90% increases
from 1.5 to 2.16, which is a 1.44× increase.
4) Defense against Fast Gradient attack in the architecture
mismatch setting: We now consider a setting where the adver-
sary is less powerful. In the architecture mismatch setting, the
adversary creates adversarial sample for a different neural net-
work (FC100-100-10) than the one being attacked (FC200-
200-200-10). These results are presented in Figure 10. We
see a significant drop in adversarial success when our defense
is used. For example, at ‖x − x˜‖ = 1.5 the adversarial
success falls from 51.2% to 13.2% using the defense with
k = 40, which is a 38.0% or 3.9× drop. Also, the budget
required to achieve a misclassification rate of 40% increases
from 1.3 to 2.5, which is a 2× increase. The performance of
our defense in this setting, which is commonly referred to as
a ‘black-box’ setting highlights that the defense can mitigate
the transferability of adversarial samples to a large extent.
With these results for neural networks, we conclude that
our defenses are effective against a variety of different attacks,
in each of which the nature of the adversarial perturbation is
very different. We have also shown that our defense is effective
against the state of the art attack for neural networks in the
white-box setting, making a case for it to be included as a
crucial component of any defensive measures against evasion
attacks. These results also demonstrate that our defense can
be used in conjunction with different types of classifiers,
providing a general method for defending against adversarial
inputs.
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Fig. 11: Effectiveness of the defense for the HAR dataset
against optimal white-box attacks on Linear SVMs. Adver-
sarial example success on the HAR dataset versus perturbation
magnitude  for the Linear SVM attack. Plotted for each
reduced dimension k used in the defense.
C. Applicability for different datasets
Next, we modify the baseline configuration by changing
the datasets used. We show results with Linear SVMs as the
classifier and PCA as the dimensionality reduction algorithm.
We present results for the Human Activity Recognition dataset.
1) Defense for the HAR dataset: In Figure 11, the reduction
in adversarial success of a white-box attack due to the defense
using PCA on the HAR dataset is shown. At  = 0.5, the
adversarial success rate drops from 77.3% without the defense
to 48.3% with k = 70 which is a 1.6× drop respectively. In
order to achieve a misclassification rate of 90%, the amount
of perturbation needed is 0.65 without the defense, which
increases to 0.93 with k = 70. Thus, the adversarial budget
increases 2× to achieve the same adversarial success rate. The
impact on utility is modest: a drop of 2.3% for k = 70, which
is small in comparison to the gain in security.
D. Effect of PCA-based defense on utility
Table III presents the effect of our defense on the clas-
sification accuracy of benign data. The key takeaways are
that the decrease in accuracy for both neural networks and
Linear SVMs for reduced dimensions down to k = 50 is
at most 4%. Further, we notice that dimensionality reduction
using PCA can actually increase classification accuracy as
when k = 70, the accuracy on the MNIST dataset increases
from 97.47% to 97.52%. This effect probably occurs as
the dimensionality reduction can prevent over-fitting. More
aggressive dimensionality reduction however, can lead to steep
drops in classification accuracy, which is to be expected since
much of the information used for classification is lost.
E. Defense using anti-whitening
As described in Section III-E, anti-whitening is a soft
approximation of PCA where high-variance components are
MNIST data HAR data
k FC100-100-10 Linear SVM k Linear SVM
No D.R. 97.47 91.52 No D.R. 96.67
784 97.32 91.54 561 96.57
331 97.35 91.37 200 96.61
100 97.36 90.89 90 94.60
80 97.25 90.64 70 94.37
60 97.38 90.47 50 92.47
40 96.71 89.03 30 91.11
TABLE III: Utility values for the dimensionality reduction
defense. For the MNIST and HAR datasets, the classification
accuracy on the benign test set is provided for various values
of reduced dimension k used for the PCA based defense, as
well as the accuracy without the defense.
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Fig. 12: Effectiveness of the anti-whitening defense for the
MNIST dataset against FG attacks in the white box setting
on FC100-100-10.
boosted with respect to the low-variance ones, instead of just
dropping them. This can be controlled by the parameter c in
the anti-whitening transformation B = Λ
c
2UT . In Figure 12,
the effects of the defense using anti-whitening with c = 1, 2
and 3 are shown. At  = 1.0, the defense with c = 2 causes the
adversarial success to fall from 41.42% to 17.06%, which is a
24.36% or 2.4× fall. At  = 1.5, the corresponding reduction
is from 72.42% to 34.42%, which is a 38% or 2.1× decrease.
The anti-whitening defense thus performs slightly better than
the PCA defense with a comparable parameter (k = 40).
Effect of anti-whitening on utility: For FC100-100-10, the
classification rate on benign data is 97.47% without any
defense. Using anti-whitening with c = 1, 2 and 3, the utility
values are 97.45%, 97.32% and 96.83% respectively. This
shows that the anti-whitening defense is slightly better both
with respect to both security and utility as compared to the
PCA defense. The increase in utility is likely due to the fact
that dimensions are not dropped and are used to achieve better
classification performance.
These results highlight the broad applicability of our defense
across application domains. It is clear that the effectiveness of
our defense is not an artifact of the particular structure of data
from the MNIST dataset, and that the intuition for its effect
12
holds across different kinds of data.
VI. DISCUSSIONS, LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE WORK
Even though our defense reduces adversarial success rates
and increases the amount of perturbation the adversary has to
add to achieve fixed levels of misclassification in a number of
cases, there are two main areas where it can be improved in
conjunction with other defense mechanisms.
1) Further reductions in adversarial success: While our
defense causes significant reductions in adversarial success
rates in a variety of settings, there are cases where the adver-
sarial success rate is still non-trivial. In such cases, it is likely
our defense would have to be combined with other defenses
such as adversarial training [16] and ensemble methods [45]
for detection in order to create a ML system secure against
evasion attacks. Our defense has the advantage that it can be
used in conjunction with a variety of ML classifiers and it will
not interfere with the operation of other defense mechanisms.
Since our defense increases the amount of perturbation needed
to achieve a fixed misclassification rate, it may aid detection
based defenses.
2) Better data transformations: In certain settings, using
PCA for dimensionality reduction may have limited applica-
bility. For example, we found that our PCA based defense
offers only marginal security improvement for the Papernot-
CNN (See Section IX-B for details). It is likely that this effect
stems from PCA reducing the amount of local information
that the convolutional layers in the CNN are able to use
for the purposes of classification. A key step in addressing
this limitation of our defense is to use other dimensionality
reduction techniques which could reduce adversarial success
to negligible levels and work better when combined with
classifiers such as CNNs. This limitation also prevents us
from achieving state-of-the-art accuracy on image datasets
like MNIST, since the best classifiers in for these datasets
use convolutional layers. In future work we plan to explore
techniques such as autoencoders and kernel PCA for designing
robust classifiers. For certain problems, it may also be feasible
to explicitly optimize for the linear transformation achieving
the best utility-security tradeoff. This is another direction we
plan to explore.
VII. RELATED WORK
Previous defenses against adversarial examples have largely
focused on specific classifier families or application domains.
Further, the existing defenses provide improved security only
against existing attacks in the literature, and it is unclear if the
defense mechanisms will be effective against adversaries with
knowledge of their existence, i.e. strategic attacks exploiting
weaknesses in the defenses. As a case in point, Papernot et
al. [36] demonstrated a defense using distillation of neural
networks against the Jacobian-based saliency map attack [35].
However, Carlini et al. [7] showed that a modified attack
negated the effects of distillation and made the neural network
vulnerable again. Now, we give an overview of the existing
defenses.
1) Classifier-specific: Russu et al. [39] propose defenses for
SVMs by adding various kinds of regularization. Kantchelian
et al. [22] propose defenses against optimal attacks designed
specifically for tree-based classifiers. Existing defenses for
neural networks [17], [42], [55], [28], [21] make a variety
of structural modifications to improve resilience to adversarial
examples. These defenses do not readily generalize across
classifiers and may still be vulnerable to adversarial examples,
as shown by Gu and Rigazio [17].
2) Application-specific: Hendrycks and Gimpel [18] study
transforming images from the RGB space to YUV space to
enable better detection by humans and decrease misclassi-
fication rates. They also use whitening to make adversarial
perturbations in RGB images more visible to the human eye.
The effect of JPG compression on adversarial images has also
been studied [14], [12]. Their conclusions were that it has a
small beneficial effect when the perturbations are small. These
approaches are restricted to combating evasion attacks on
image data and do not generalize across applications. Further,
it is unclear if they are effective against white-box attacks.
3) General defenses: An ensemble of classifiers was used
by Smutz and Stavrou [45] to detect evasion attacks, by
checking for disagreement between various classifiers. How-
ever, an ensemble of classifiers may still be vulnerable to
adversarial examples since they generalize across classfiers.
Further, Goodfellow et. al. [16] show that ensemble methods
have limited effectiveness for evasion attacks against neural
networks. Goodfellow et. al. [16], Tramèr et al. [50] and Ma˛dry
et al. [31] re-train on adversarial samples of different types to
improve the resilience of neural networks. They all find that
adversarial training works, but needs high capacity classifiers
to be effective, and further, its effectiveness reduces as the per-
turbation is increased beyond the one used for training. In our
experiments, we find that re-training on adversarial samples
has an extremely limited effect on increasing the robustness
of linear SVMs (see Figure 14 in the Appendix), thus this
defense may not be applicable across classifiers, and does
indeed depend on the capacity of the classifier. Wang et al. [52]
use random feature nullification to reduce adversarial success
rates for evasion attacks on neural networks. The applicability
of this idea across classifiers is not studied. Zhang et al. [54]
use adversarial feature selection to increase the robustness of
SVMs. They find and retain features that decrease adversarial
success rates. This defense may be generalized across other
classifiers and is an interesting direction for future work.
Due to the classifier and dataset-agnostic nature of our
defense, it may be combined with existing defenses such as ad-
versarial training which have differnet aims for an even larger
improvement in robustness. For example, neural networks may
be trained with reduced dimension samples, and the training
process can also incorporate the adversarial loss to further
increase the robustness of the network. We plan to explore
these directions in future work.
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VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we considered the novel use of data trans-
formations such as dimensionality reduction as a defense
mechanism against evasion attacks on ML classifiers. Our
defenses rely on the insight that (a) linear transformations of
data allow access to usually inaccessible security-performance
tradeoffs, and (b) training classifiers on reduced dimension
data leads to enhanced resilience of ML classifiers (by reduc-
ing the weights of less informative and low-variance features).
Using empirical evaluation on multiple real-world datasets,
we demonstrated a 2x reduction in adversarial success rates
across a range of attack strategies (including white-box ones),
ML classifiers, and applications. Our defenses have a modest
impact on the utility of the classifiers (0.5-2% reduction),
and are computationally efficient. Our work thus provides
an attractive foundation for countering the threat of evasion
attacks.
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IX. APPENDIX
A. Complexity Analysis of PCA Defenses
The defense using PCA adds a one-time O(d2n + d3)
overhead for finding the principal components, with the first
term arising from the covariance matrix computation and the
second term from the eigenvector decomposition. There is
also a one-time overhead for training a new classifier on the
reduced dimension data. The time needed to train the new
classifier will be less than that needed for the original classifier
since the dimensionality of the input data has reduced. Each
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Fig. 14: Effectiveness of adversarial training for the MNIST
dataset against optimal white box attacks on Linear SVMs.
The Linear SVM was trained using gradient descent with
periodically augmented training sets containing adversarial
samples with the specified perturbation values.
subsequent input will incur a O(dk) overhead due to the
matrix multiplication needed to project it onto the principal
components.
B. CNNs
We also run our experiments on a Convolutional Neural
Network [15] whose architecture we obtain from Papernot
et al. [36]. This CNN’s architecture is as follows: it has 2
convolutional layers of 32 filters each, followed by a max
pooling layer, then another 2 convolutional layers of 64 filters
each, followed by a max pooling layer. Finally, we have two
fully connected layers with 200 neurons each, followed by a
softmax output with 10 neurons (for the 10 classes in MNIST).
All neurons in the hidden layers are ReLUs. We call this
network Papernot-CNN. It is trained with a learning rate of
0.1 (adjusted to 0.01 for the last 10 epochs) and momentum of
0.9 for 50 epochs. The batchsize is 500 samples for MNIST
and on the MNIST test data we get a classification accuracy
of 98.91% with the Papernot-CNN network.
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